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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
Nos. 14-4767 & 14-4768 
___________ 
 
DAVID V. ALSTON, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
KEAN UNIVERSITY; DR. PHILIP H. WITT;  
 SARAH D. BLOOD 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Nos. 2-13-cv-00309 & 2-14-cv-01338) 
District Judge:  Honorable Susan D. Wigenton 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 12, 2015 
 
Before: FISHER, KRAUSE and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: June 16, 2015) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
           ___________
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PER CURIAM 
 
 David Alston, proceeding pro se, appeals from District Court orders denying his 
“Motion to Vacate Void Judgments and Remand Case.”  For the reasons that follow, we 
will affirm.   
Following disciplinary proceedings, Kean University suspended Alston because of 
inappropriate behavior toward another student, Sarah Blood.  In January 2013, Alston 
filed a complaint, which he later amended, in the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey, naming as defendants Kean University, Blood, and Dr. Phillip H. 
Witt, a psychologist, who examined Alston in connection with the disciplinary 
proceedings.  Witt and Kean filed motions to dismiss; Blood filed an answer.  The 
District Court granted the motions to dismiss, concluding that Kean University was not a 
“person” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and was immune from suit under the Eleventh 
Amendment, that Alston had failed to state a claim as to Witt, and that it would be futile 
to permit Alston to amend his complaint again.  The District Court dismissed the claims 
against Blood for lack of diversity of jurisdiction.  Alston appealed,1 and we affirmed.  
Alston v. Kean Univ., 549 F. App’x 86 (3d Cir. Dec. 19, 2013).  
 In February 2014, Alston filed a separate complaint against Kean University, 
Blood, and Witt.  The District Court summarily dismissed the complaint, concluding that 
                                              
1 Alston also filed a motion under Rule 60(b), seeking leave to amend his complaint and 
requesting that the District Court Judge disqualify herself from his case.  The District 
Court denied that motion, and Alston filed a second notice of appeal.  The two appeals 
were consolidated.     
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the allegations made therein were substantially similar to the claims that Alston had 
raised in his prior civil suit.  Alston appealed and we affirmed.  Alston v. Kean Univ., 
575 F. App’x 95 (3d Cir. Sept. 8, 2014). 
In October 2014, Alston filed in both District Court actions a “Motion to Vacate 
Void Judgments and Remand Case.”  Those identical motions, brought under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4), alleged that the District Court’s rejection of his 
complaints was a “usurpation of power.”  Alston argued that the District Court “should 
have . . . dismissed [his claims] without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction” 
so that he could “litigate the same case against the same defendants in a subsequent 
action as though the previously dismissed action was never started.”  The District Court 
denied the motions, noting that “the Orders [Alston] now challenges have been affirmed 
on appeal.”  Alston appealed. 
We have jurisdiction over the appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  An order 
denying a Rule 60(b)(4) motion is subject to plenary review.  See Budget Blinds, Inc. v. 
White, 536 F.3d 244, 251 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Page v. Schweiker, 786 F.2d 150, 
152 (3d Cir. 1986)).  Rule 60(b)(4) provides for relief when a judgment is void.  A 
judgment may be void if the court that rendered it lacked jurisdiction over the subject 
matter or the parties, or entered a decree which was not within the powers granted to it by 
law.  See Marshall v. Board of Educ., Bergenfield, N.J., 575 F.2d 417, 422 (3d Cir. 
1978). 
Alston has failed to establish that the orders dismissing his civil rights actions 
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were in any way void.  Alston’s Rule 60(b)(4) motions sought relief on the ground that 
the District Court acted in “excess of jurisdiction.”  For instance, Alston asserted that the 
dismissal of Kean University on immunity grounds “simply means lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction of [the District Court] to oversee the case.”  According to Alston, because the 
District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, its judgments were void.  This argument 
should have been raised on appeal, and certainly does not establish that the District Court 
lacked jurisdiction over the civil rights actions such that the judgments rendered are void.  
See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002) (recognizing that “it is familiar law 
that a federal court always has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction.”); cf. Picco 
v. Global Marine Drilling Co., 900 F.2d 846, 850 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that a district 
court’s exercise of subject matter jurisdiction is res judicata and cannot be attacked 
through a Rule 60(b)(4) motion if the party alleging that the judgment is void had a 
previous opportunity challenge jurisdiction but failed to do so).  At bottom, Alston 
appears to contend that the District Court’s judgments were incorrect.  That allegation, 
however, is not sufficient for obtaining relief under Rule 60(b)(4).  See, e.g., United 
Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 270 (2010) (explaining that “[a] void 
judgment is a legal nullity,” and that “[a] judgment is not void, for example, simply 
because it is or may have been erroneous.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).    
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s orders denying 
Alston’s Rule 60(b)(4) motions. 
